[The following is an excerpted from “Managing Environmental Liability” written by Larry Schnapf and published by Juris Law Publishing]

Confidentiality of Environmental Audits

Regulatory authorities and neighboring parties who have filed a toxic tort action may seek to use environmental audits as evidence of the existence of contamination or unlawful practices. In some cases, the information contained in the audits could be used to establish knowing violations that could lead to criminal liability. Since government prosecutors and private plaintiffs may seek disclosure of environmental reports during discovery, parties performing environmental due diligence should consider taking steps to  protect the confidentiality of these environmental reports
There are essentially three privileges that an attorney could try to invoke to protect the confidentiality of environmental reports. Each of these privileges must be affirmatively asserted or it may be waived. Furthermore, because they are exceptions to the rules of evidence favoring full disclosure, courts will narrowly construe the privileges.

(1)	Attorney-Client Privilege-This privilege protects confidential communications between an attorney and the client. The intent of the privilege is to encourage a client to fully and freely communicate with the attorney. The privilege extends to communications rendering legal advice that are made at the request of the client. Generally, the underlying facts in a report are not privileged although an attorney can try to extend the privilege to the facts by carefully interweaving the facts into the legal analysis. However, merely labeling a document as privileged will not necessarily create the privilege. Courts often take a functional approach to a document and try to determine if the primary purpose of the report was to obtain legal advice. For example, in U.S. v. Chevron,1 periodic environmental status reports were found not to be privileged even though an attorney had been part of the three-member team that had conducted the audits. The court ruled that the primary purpose of the reports were not to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the client but to evaluate compliance with the Clean Air Act.

(2)	Work-Product Privilege-This rule applies to materials collected or prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. In some respects, this privilege is broader then the attorney-client privilege because it extends beyond oral or written communications to such things as memorandum, photographs, drawings, and even computer-generated data. Like attorney-client communications, opinion work product (mental impressions, opinions, reasoning, and conclusions of the attorney) are given absolute protection from disclosure. However, "ordinary" work product is only a qualified privilege and may be subject to disclosure if a court finds that another party may suffer undue hardship.
The requirement that the material is prepared in anticipation of litigation does not require that the litigation must actually have been commenced or that it is imminent. However, it should be more than a remote possibility. Furthermore, the litigation is not limited to judicial proceedings but may also extend to administrative proceedings.
Finally, the privilege does not extend to materials prepared in the "ordinary course of business." This limitation may make it more difficult to cloak periodic and voluntary audit reports under the attorney-work product privilege. Thus, it is important for an attorney to become involved early in a matter to demonstrate that litigation was anticipated and that the reports were prepared in preparation for litigation.

(3)	Self-Evaluation Privilege-This is a recent judicially-created privilege designed to encourage companies to evaluate and correct noncompliance with laws by subjecting the information collected to a privilege. However, many courts have refused to apply the privilege if nondisclosure will impede enforcement of environmental laws, especially where Congress has imposed extensive reporting requirements.2

In Reichold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron,3 in which this author was involved, a federal court extended the doctrine of self-critical analysis for the first time to environmental reports. In that case, the plaintiff sought recovery of remediation costs from prior owners and operators of its facility. The defendants sought discovery of the groundwater investigation conducted by the plaintiff in the hope that the groundwater reports would show that the contamination was at least partially the fault of the plaintiff. The court ruled that the doctrine of self-critical analysis could be applied to studies involving past conditions but would not extend to studies designed to uncover possible future problems. This case was important as a precedent but its usefulness will hinge on the particular facts of a case since the party advocating the privilege will have to show that the reports were intended to study the past effects of pollution. At many sites, it may be difficult to distinguish retrospective studies from prospective studies. In addition, since this case involved private parties, it is unclear if another court will extend the privilege to situations where the government is seeking the documents.
The limitations of the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel were illustrated in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Manufacturing Corp.4 In this case, an in-house lawyer for the defendant negotiated the environmental provisions of a contract to sell certain assets to the plaintiff. When the parties could not agree on the environmental liabilities to be assumed by the purchaser, the defendant terminated the agreement. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action and sought to depose the in-house environmental counsel about certain recommendations the attorney had made to the defendant's management. The defendant asserted the attorney-client privilege but the court ruled that the privilege did not extend to lawyers acting as negotiators of business transactions nor to the communications with management about the contract negotiations. The court said the plaintiff was entitled to know what environmental matters the in-house environmental counsel believed were covered and the exposure faced by the defendant as a result of the negotiations in order to evaluate if the defendant as a matter of business judgment had agreed to assume certain environmental risks. As a result, the court ordered the in-house counsel to testify.
As the use of environmental compliance audits has grown, the regulated community has become increasingly concerned over how the information contained in these reports will be used by the governmental regulatory agencies, environmental organizations, citizen groups, and other private litigants. Environmental compliance audits can serve many useful purposes. They can help companies identify health and safety risks, assess the effectiveness of corporate environmental programs, improve personnel training and environmental awareness, and prioritize corporate resources available for environmental compliance or implementation of pollution prevention programs. However, the possibility that this information could be used by regulatory agencies or private citizen groups can discourage companies from implementing environmental auditing programs. Indeed, a recent Price Waterhouse study showed that 67% of the companies with auditing programs said they would expand their programs if adequate protection was provided to the information contained in those reports. Nine percent of respondents reported that the results of their audits had been involuntarily disclosed. Of the 24% who had voluntarily disclosed their audit reports, half of the companies indicated that the information had been used against them by government regulators.
To encourage the regulated community to voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental violations, the EPA has issued a series of environmental auditing policies while encouraging the use of self-policing environmental audits. The first EPA Environmental Policy was issued in 1986 and essentially defined what constituted an acceptable environmental audit as well as stating that the agency would not routinely request audit reports.5  However, the agency expressly reserved its rights to view any information that it would otherwise be able to obtain under the various reporting requirements of other environmental statutes when the agency determined that this information was necessary to accomplish its statutory mission. The agency did state that it would take into account a company's auditing program when calculating an appropriate penalty for violations.
Following the 1986 Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, the Department of Justice published a guidance document of its auditing policy in 1991. In this document, the DOJ said the existence of self-auditing procedures and voluntary disclosure would be viewed as a mitigating factor in criminal enforcement matters.6 The policy also stated that environmental audits could not be relied upon to create a right or otherwise limit the litigative prerogatives of the DOJ or EPA. Indeed, when some states began enacting environmental privilege statutes, the DOJ suggested it might challenge those statutes.
Two years later, the Final Draft Environmental Sentencing Guidelines were issued. These provided for mitigation of sentences when courts found that an environmental compliance program meeting certain criteria had been in effect. In 1994, the EPA's Director of Criminal Enforcement issued a guidance document stating that the agency would not refer for criminal enforcement violations voluntarily revealed and promptly corrected as part of a company's comprehensive environmental auditing program.7
As states began enacting their own environmental auditing privilege statutes and as federal legislation began working its way through Congress, the EPA announced in 1994 that it would reevaluate its policies towards environmental auditing. Shortly thereafter, the EPA issued its 1994 Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing.8 This restatement was not intended to change any existing EPA policies, but was issued under the belief that there was widespread confusion in the regulated community as to the agency’s policy towards environmental auditing and voluntary disclosure.
After holding numerous public meetings on the issue, the agency issued an interim policy in early 1995 and solicited comments.9 A final environmental auditing policy statement was issued in December 1995.10   Under its final environmental auditing policy statement, EPA said it would not seek gravity-based penalties for violations uncovered during the performance of an environmental audit or other acceptable environmental due diligence program if the company meets nine specified conditions.11 Gravity-based penalties are assessments based on the seriousness of the violation and not on the economic benefit gained from non-compliance. If the company can satisfy the second through the ninth conditions, EPA would reduce the penalty by 75%. To provide additional incentives for self-policing, the EPA stated that it reduced penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntarily discovered as well as promptly reported and corrected even where the company cannot document the existence of an acceptable due diligence prograrn.12 The agency reserved its right to recover any economic benefits gained as a result of non-compliance.
The agency also indicated it will not recommend criminal prosecution for violations uncovered during environmental auditing or due diligence when the company satisfies all nine conditions of the policy. Since violations that cause serious harm or pose imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment are not covered by the policy, EPA could recommend criminal prosecution for such violations. Moreover, the policy will not apply where corporate officials are consciously involved in or willfully blind to violations or conceal or condone non-compliance.13 The agency also clarified that when a company has satisfied the conditions for avoiding recommendation for criminal prosecution, the EPA will not levy any gravity-based penalties.
The policy does not apply to acts by individual managers or employees of a company. Thus, while a business owner or a plant manager who reports a violation may help to protect their employer, the disclosure could possibly expose the individual to criminal liability if the government could show that the individual was responsible for the violation. It is difficult to see how individuals will be motivated to report violations when they could face potential civil or criminal liability.
It should be emphasized that while the policy can operate to free a company from gravity-based penalties and from the fear of criminal prosecution, it will not relieve a company from the costs of correcting the violation.
EPA also reaffirmed its long-standing policy to refrain from routine requests for audits. However, the agency did indicate that if it has independent evidence of a violation, it may seek information contained in audits to establish the nature and extent of the problem and the degree of culpability.14
Following are the nine conditions that companies must satisfy to reduce or eliminate gravity-based penalties under the EPA auditing policy:
1. Discovery of the Violation Through an Environmental Audit or Due Diligence. The information must be obtained through an environmental audit that satisfies the criteria set forth in the 1986 policy statement or a systematic procedure or practice that meets the definition of due diligence set forth in the policy.15 Where the violation is detected through a process that does not constitute an environmental audit under the 1986 policy, the company will have to establish that the process satisfied the criteria for due diligence. The EPA may also require as a condition of mitigation that a description of the due diligence process be made available for public review.16
2. Voluntary Discovery. The violation must be identified voluntarily and not through some monitoring process required by statute, such as effluent exceedances detected during DMRs and emissions violations discovered during continuous emissions monitoring. Likewise, violations detected as part of compliance auditing performed pursuant to a consent decree or settlement agreement will not be considered to have been voluntarily discovered.17
3. Prompt Disclosure. Violations voluntarily discovered must be reported to the EPA in writing within ten days of discovery. The requirement in the interim policy that disclosure also had to be made to state and local authorities was eliminated although EPA indicated it would work closely with local agencies to implement the policy.
If an applicable statute or regulation requires a shorter reporting period, the disclosure should be made within the timeframe required by that statute or regulation. Where reporting within ten days is not practical because of the complexity of the violation, and compliance cannot be determined with that timeframe, EPA may accept later disclosure if the circumstances do not present a serious threat and the regulated entity establishes that greater time was needed to determine compliance status.18
It is important to note that the disclosure requirement pertains to actual violations as well as to suspected violations. If an entity has doubt whether a violation actually exists, the EPA recommended disclosure.19
Compliance agreements and descriptions of due diligence programs will generally be available to the public pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). It is unclear if information regarding particular violations could be subject to the Confidentiality Business Information provisions of that law.20 Thus, it is possible that the disclosed information could be available under FOIA to such parties as prospective corporate purchasers or investors, lenders, share-holders, labor unions, and communities where the facilities are located.
4. Discovery and Disclosure Independent of Government or Third-Party Plain-tiffs. To qualify as a voluntary violation, the infraction must be identified prior to the commencement of any government inspection, information request, enforcement action, notice of any citizen suit, or discovery by any whistleblower. If a regulated entity learns that the government is about to make an inspection or receives notice of a citizen suit and then initiates an audit that uncovers the particular violation, the EPA will not consider the violation to be voluntarily discovered or disclosed.21
5. Correction and Remediation. In order to qualify for penalty mitigation, the entity will also have to expeditiously correct the violation and remediate any harm caused by the violation. The policy requires that the violation be corrected within 60 days using measures approved by EPA, and that the entity provide written certification to the EPA when the violation has been corrected. If a longer period will be required, the entity must notify the EPA in writing prior to the expiration of the 60-day period. For complex or lengthy corrective actions, the EPA may require the entity to enter into an administrative order or other binding agreement.22
6. Prevent Recurrence. The regulated entity must agree in writing to take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, including improvements to its environ-mental auditing or due diligence procedures.23
7.	No Repeat Violations. The specific violation or a closely related violation cannot have occurred during the previous three years or cannot be a part of a pattern of violations by the facility's parent during the preceding five years. For purposes of this condition, a violation includes any act or omission for which the entity received a penalty reduction in the past, such as minor violations that were settled informally.24
8. Excluded Violations. Penalty reductions are not available for violations resulting in serious harm or that may have posed imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment. The policy also precludes penalty reductions for violations of specific terms in consent decrees or other settlement agreements or orders.25
9. Cooperation. The regulated entity will provide information which EPA determines is necessary to evaluate the applicability of the policy and cooperate with EPA in its investigation. This could include providing requested documents, access to employees, and full disclosure of any non-compliance problems or environmental consequences associated with the violation.26 This condition suggests that once an investigation is underway, the government will use these audits as an enforcement tool. Thus, the environmental audits or due diligence reports could be potentially self-incriminating for both companies and individuals. Faced with that potential, it would seem that individuals will likely be hesitant to be completely open during the audit process for fear of incriminating themselves or their employers.
The EPA reaffirmed its firm opposition to the enactment of state statutes creating environmental auditing privileges and indicated it would continue to work with the states to ensure that the state laws are not inconsistent with the federal policy. 

STATE AUDIT POLICIES

Despite the long-stated opposition, 14 states that have been delegated authority to administer and enforce the principal environmental programs have enacted laws creating some form of privilege for environmental compliance audits. These privilege statutes generally fall into two categories. The first category offers a qualified privilege for environmental audits while the second kind contains a privilege as well as some form of immunity or penalty mitigation. Following is a summary of the principal features of the various state programs which were in effect in 1996.
Arkansas: This law was enacted on February 17, 1995, and became effective 90 days after the legislative session ended. This law only offers privilege from discovery and does not provide immunity from prosecution for voluntary disclosure of information discovered during an environmental audit. For the privilege to apply, information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document." The law is simply an environmental privilege law. It does not provide for immunity from prosecution nor reduction in penalties for voluntary disclosure. The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing both the privilege and that it has pursued reasonable efforts towards compliance. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for disclosure.27
California: The state has proposed legislation that is very similar to the EPA program. It contains the same nine conditions that regulated entities are required to meet to obtain a reduction or elimination of gravity-based penalties. However, the state will allow further penalty reductions of 15% for investments in pollution prevention programs. In addition, the state program would expand the circumstances under which cases may be referred for criminal prosecution. Under the proposed policy, a criminal referral may take place where there exists "a management philosophy or practice that concealed or condoned the violation, or the conscious and knowing involvement in, or willful blindness to violations of high level corporate officials or managers."
Colorado: This law was enacted in 1994.28 This is a privilege and immunity statute where there is not only a privilege from disclosure of environmental audits but also limited immunity from prosecution for companies that voluntarily disclose violations discovered during the audits. The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing its prima facie case. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for disclosure.
Idaho: This law became effective in 1995. It provides for a privilege and also offers immunity from administrative, civil, and criminal violations when a company discovers the violations as part of an environmental audit and discloses these violations to the state. In order to obtain immunity, the company would have to implement corrective actions within 60 days of the audit.29 The law does not provide for immunity in cases of fraud.
Illinois: This law was enacted in 1994. It is simply an environmental privilege law. It does not provide for immunity from prosecution nor for a reduction in penalties for voluntary disclosure. To qualify for the privilege, the information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document." The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege but does not have the burden to establish that it corrected the violation in a reasonable amount of time. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing lack of reasonable diligence towards compliance and the conditions for disclosure.30
Indiana: This law was enacted in 1994. It is simply an environmental privilege law. It does not provide for immunity from prosecution nor for a reduction in penalties for voluntary disclosure. To qualify for the privilege, the information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document." The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege and that it has taken reasonable steps towards compliance. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for the disclosure.31
Kansas: This law was enacted in 1995. It provides for a privilege and also offers limited immunity from administrative, civil, and criminal violations when a company discovers the violations as part of an environmental audit and discloses these violations to the state.32
Kentucky: This law was enacted in 1994. It is simply an environmental privilege law. It does not provide for immunity from prosecution nor for a reduction in penalties for voluntary disclosure. To qualify for the privilege, the information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document.” The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege and that it has taken reasonable steps towards compliance. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for disclosure.33
Minnesota: This law was enacted in 1995. It offers limited immunity to businesses who conduct audits and file them with the state. Penalties for violations are waived if the violations are corrected within 90 days. However, there is no immunity for violation causing serious harm to the public or involving serious criminal conduct. The audit is treated as confidential business information.
Mississippi: This law was enacted in 1995. It provides for a privilege and also offers limited immunity from criminal violations and penalty reduction when a company discovers the violations as part of an environmental audit and discloses these violations to the state.34
Oregon: This was the nation's first environmental audit privilege law and was enacted in 1993. It is simply an environmental privilege law. It does not provide for immunity from prosecution nor for a reduction in penalties for voluntary disclosure. To qualify for the privilege, the information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document." The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege and that it has taken reasonable steps towards compliance. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for disclosure.35
Texas: This law became effective in 1995. It provides a privilege from disclosure for environmental audits and offers immunity from administrative, civil, and criminal violations when a company discovers the violations as part of an environmental audit and discloses these violations to the state. In order to obtain immunity, the company would have to correct the violation within a reasonable period of time. However, immunity does not apply for reckless, intentional, or knowing violations. The privilege would be waived if it is fraudulently asserted or the information presented a clear, present, and impending danger to the public. The party seeking disclosure of the report would have the burden of establishing that the report was not entitled to the privilege.36
Utah: This law was enacted in 1995. It offers privilege from discovery, and some limited immunity for civil penalties may be available if violations are promptly corrected, but does not provide for immunity from prosecution for voluntary disclosure. The privilege may be waived when it is fraudulently asserted or the violations pose a danger to the public.37
Virginia: This law was enacted in 1995. It provides for a privilege and also offers limited immunity from penalties when a company discovers the violations as part of an environmental audit and discloses these violations to the state. The privilege does not extend to violations posing clear, imminent, and substantial danger to the public or to audits performed in bad faith, such as to ward off an imminent investigation by the state. Parties seeking disclosure have the burden of establishing that the privilege should not apply.38
Wyoming: This law was enacted in 1995. It offers a privilege law for environmental audits and limited immunity from criminal prosecution for information discovered during the audit that is voluntarily disclosed to the state. To qualify for the privilege, the information discovered in an environmental audit must be contained in a document entitled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document. 'The privilege may be lost if it is fraudulently asserted or if violations were not corrected within a reasonable period of time. The party seeking to assert the privilege has the burden of establishing the privilege and that it has taken reasonable steps towards compliance. The party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing the conditions for disclosure.39
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AUDIT POLICIES IN TRANSACTIONS
 
The existence of the federal auditing policy and the state immunity laws should provide significant financial incentives to prospective purchasers of businesses and lenders to require pre-loan or pre-transfer due diligence that go beyond the ASTM standards and address environmental compliance issues since a seller or borrower who voluntarily discloses violations discovered during this process could substantially reduce its potential environmental liability. Moreover, the corrective action requirements of the federal policy requiring violations to be addressed within 60 days or as expeditiously as possible could act as model for post-closing environmental remediation conditions. Purchasers and lenders could insist that the policy be followed as a condition of the sale or loan.

In order to maximize the possibility that environmental reports could fall within one of the foregoing privileges, the following steps should be followed:

(1)	The audit should be performed by an outside counsel at the request of the client's attorney. The environmental firm should be retained by the attorney and not the client.

(2)	The letter hiring the environmental consultant should specifically state that the audit is being requested to assist the attorney in rendering legal advice to the client. If the attorney work-product privilege will be relied upon, the letter should identify the litigation that is pending and indicate that the audit was to be prepared for that action. The letters should also state that the consultant will be acting under the supervision and direction of the attorney. In addition, the attorney's role should be clearly documented. For example, the consultant should be advised that all reports are to be submitted solely to the attorney and that the attorney is to participate in all meetings and site visits. Toward this end, it is advisable that the attorney be the person requesting such meetings and the attorney should indicate that such meetings are designed to help advise the client about actual or potential violations of law.

(3)	In reviewing the report, the attorney should ensure that the consultant simply notes its observations without drawing any conclusions. Any evaluations or recommendations that may be desired by the client should be placed in a separate section from the factual observations so that if the underlying facts have to be disclosed, the conclusionary section could still possibly be cloaked under a privilege. To minimize the impact that statements may subsequently have, potential noncompliance should be expressed in terms of "areas of concern" rather than violations. If the attorney work-product privilege is being asserted, it may be preferable to have the factual sections integrated with legal analysis to try to get the entire document within the privilege. Of course, this strategy could backfire if a court finds that the facts are so interwoven with the legal analysis that the entire report will have to be disclosed.

(4)	Distribution should be limited to those managers who have direct responsibility for the problems that may be identified in the report. The reports should not be routinely distributed to senior management. Such disclosure to non-attorneys could result in a waiver of a privilege.

There may be circumstances where a person who could assert a privilege may nevertheless decide against nondisclosure. For example, CERCLA and other environmental statutes contain notification provisions that require owners or operators of facilities to disclose the existence of spills or contamination above

certain threshold concentrations. A financial institution in possession of information indicating that such a reporting threshold has been met will generally not be under an obligation to disclose such information to regulatory authorities so long as the lender is not an owner or operator of the site nor in possession of the facility. If the lender nevertheless wishes to foreclose and sell the property, it might consider furnishing the information to the regulatory authorities and attempt to negotiate an agreement that would allow the lender to sell the property and receive a covenant not to sue from the government in exchange for a de minimis payment.
Similarly, if a party otherwise qualifies for the CERCLA innocent purchaser's defense, acquires title, and then performs an environmental audit prior to selling the property that reveals previously unknown contamination, the party would be required to disclose the existence of the contamination to the prospective purchaser in order to preserve this defense.21
Finally, companies may decide to disclose the results of environmental audits to establish a better relationship with a regulatory agency and to mitigate the possible amount of penalties that may be imposed. For example, the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated a policy statement in 1991 that indicated that in determining whether to bring criminal charges against a violator, the DOJ will consider if the violator made voluntary, timely, and complete disclosure of available information.22

1.        757 F. Supp 512
2.	CPC Int'l v. Hartford Acc., 620 A.2d 462 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 1992); Ohio V. CECOS International, 583 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); U.S. V. Dexter, 31 ERC 2027 ([).C. Corin. 1990).
3.	No. 92-30393-RV (N.D. Fla. 1994).
4.	No.93 Civ 5125 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y. Jan.25, 1996).
5.	1986 Environmental Auditing Statement, 51 P.R. 25004 (July 9, 1986).
6.	"Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator" (July 1, 1991).
7.	"The Exercises of Investigative Discretion" (January 20, 1994).
8.	59 FR 38455 (July 28, 1994).
9.	Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 FR 16,875 (April 3, 1995).
10.	60 FR 66706 Dec. 22, 1995).
11.	Id. at 66707.
12.    Id.
13. 	Id 
14.	Id. 
15.	Id. at 66710.
16.	Id. at 66708.
17	 Id.
18.	Id.
19.	Id. at 66709.
20.	Id.
21.	Id.
22.	Id. at 66711.
23.	Id.
24.	Id. at 66709.
25	Id.
26.	Id. at 66712.
27.	Act No.350.
28.	Col. Rev. Stat.  13-25-126.5.
29.	S.B. 1142.
30.	Ill.  Public Act 88-0690.
31.	Ind. Code § 13-10.
32.	S.B. 76.
33.	Title XVIII, Ky. Stat. 224.01~040.
34.	S.B. 3079
35.	Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.963.
36.	H.B. 2473.
37.	S.B. 84.
38.	H.B. 1845.
39.	Act No.26.